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Manipulating Forum Jurisdiction

and Generating a Law of
Employee Free Speech
By Ivan C. Rutledge*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act' contains protection of employee
solicitation, handbilling, and choice of representatives that the first and
fourteenth amendments do not vouchsafe to other members of society.
This essay is written to review the development of this thesis and to
argue that the United States Supreme Court has fashioned a regime of
forum jurisdiction surrounding employees' rights to speak and print that
is both unique and exquisitely complex. Two patterns of allocating jurisdiction, both subsumed under the fuzzy expression "federal pre-emption," engender the complexity.' This article will first review the Court's
' Walter F. George Distinguished Professor Of Law, Walter F. George School of Law,
Mercer University; Carson-Newman College (B.A., 1934); Duke University (M.A., 1940);
Duke University (L.L.B., 1946); Columbia University (L.L.M., 1952).
1. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. A
final amendment was Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent
references will be to "the Act" unless otherwise specified.
2. The Court has on the one hand voted for forum jurisdiction in the courts concurrent
with that of the National Labor Relations Board, subject of course to the supremacy of
federal law in state as well as federal courts. On the other, the Court has from time to time
staked out, with varying formulas, a zone of exclusive primary jurisdiction in the Board,
such that not even the Court itself should pronounce on federal law until the Board has first
spoken. In the exclusive zone, for example, a federal district court rules for the defendant
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), even if pressed for a ruling under 12(b)(6)
by an argument that under the National Labor Relations Act the plaintiff has failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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precedents before the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, then discuss what followed in the 1950's, then, penultimately, review the Court's holding in
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114,s the campaign defamation case of 1966, and, finally, discuss the employer's property line.
One approach can be understood as elaborated from Gibbons v. Ogden'
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.6 It consists of recognizing the jurisdiction
of state tribunals to try whether a state regulation of commerce conflicts
with federal law and postulates that the states possess some concurrent
jurisdiction to regulate commerce among the states, when local conformity yields a polity superior to national uniformity. Before the National
Labor Relations Act was amended in 1947 to add unfair labor practice
prohibitions addressed to labor organizations, s the Court in Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,7 without even
questioning the jurisdiction of a state agency, affirmed the judgment of
the state supreme court which upheld the agency's order against mass
picketing s
The Local argued that the order was repugnant to the Act (not that the
state tribunals were without jurisdiction), but the Court concluded that
since the state system was, in this instance, devoted to preventing
breaches of the peace in connection with labor disputes, it could be reconciled with the Act, and that as focused in this case, the two regimes could
consistently stand together. The opinion of the Court did not allude to
Cooley, which upheld state pilotage rules for the port of Philadelphia, but
adverted to the long-standing insistence of the Court that an "intention
of Congress to exclude States from exerting their police power must be
clearly manifested."' This approach approximates that of Justice Daniel,
3. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)1(1824).
5. 53 U.S.(12 How.) 299 (1851), followed in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978).
6. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976)).
7. 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
8. Id. at 751. As a state board may be held a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, there was
an argument that if the federal board had exclusive jurisdiction the Court itself had no
jurisdiction other than to hold that the order was void. This precise argument would not
succeed if the state tribunal was a trial court of general jurisdiction, but the result may
nevertheless be the same. See text accompanying notes 31-38 infra. Also, indeed, Congress
may have deprived a court of general jurisdiction of the jurisdiction it normally has to determine its jurisdiction. Compare NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971) with Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). For a discussion of timely assertion
of want of subject-matter jurisdiction, see the incisive treatment in Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51
MINN. L. REv. 491, 492 n.8, 525-528 nn.162, 167, 529 (1967).
9. 315 U.S. at 749 (citations omitted).
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who, concurring in Cooley, characterized the pilotage rules as not "essentially and regularly within that power of commercial regulation vested by
the Constitution in Congress." 10
II.

PRECEDENTS BEFORE 1948

The Gibbons branch of the formula is displayed in Hill v.Florida,"
which reaches the assembly or choice-of-representatives component of
employee interests protected by the Act, but not those of soliciting or
handbilling. The case came to the Court from the Florida Courts, and no
question was raised of their jurisdiction. The question was on a Florida
statute which provided that no person could serve as a union official unless he had been a citizen for ten years, was of good moral character, and
had no felony conviction. To enforce these disabilities, anyone seeking to
serve as a business representative had to obtain a license. The Court held
the statute in conflict with the Act and inoperative under the Supremacy
Clause, because of expressions in the Act (section 713 and especially section 918). providing for employee freedom of choice. "Thus, the 'full freedom' of employees in collective bargaining which Congress envisioned as
essential to protect the free flow of commerce among the states would be,
by the Florida statute, shrunk to a greatly limited freedom. 1 4 "Congress
attached no conditions whatsoever"' 5 to employees' choice of
representatives.
So much, for the time being, for the vigor of the Act under the
Supremacy Clause. It, as its own terms require, is administered equally
by federal and state judges. Hill nails down an immunity under the Act
from state regulation, in favor of a nationally uniform rule of freedom of
choice as a part of congressional regulation of commerce among the
states. Five years earlier, under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama," had postulated a freedom of any person, not just employees, to discuss the facts of a labor
dispute. This constitutional immunity does not extend to mass picketing, 7 nor does the statutory freedom of association extend to mutiny, as
10. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 325 (Daniel, J., concurring).
11. 325 U.S. 538 (1945). That is, a state court with jurisdiction, but error under the
supremacy clause in misapplying the Act of Congress regulating commerce. See note 2
supra.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
14. 325 U.S. at 542.
15. Id. at 541.
16. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
17. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
437 (1942). Compare Allen-Bradley, above at note 7, on concurrent jurisdiction of the forum
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held in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB.1'
Alternative to the Supremacy Clause approach is the recognition, by
statutory or judicial designation, of a federal agency as seized of exclusive
original, or primary, jurisdiction to litigate disputes arising under federal
law, specifically, a statutory regulation of commerce like the Act. An
example is Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Board.1 ' A New York statute, in that case, gave its agency powers similar
to those granted by section 9 of the Act to the Board in Washington
(hereinafter "the Board" unless otherwise qualified). The Board has to
resolve questions of choice of representatives, including the determination
of what employees are eligible to vote in a Board-directed election. A major status-resolving function of the Board in making that determination is
delineating the bounds of the election district or, as the Act puts it, ascertaining the "unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining"' 0
with the employer. The state agency had asserted jurisdiction over the
same employees and their respective employers as were subject to the
Board's jurisdiction under section 9. The Court held that, even if the
Board would not act, the state agency had no jurisdiction because of the
mere existence of the Act and the powers it confers upon the Board.
Although the opinion noted that the New York and United States policies were at some points in conflict, it is essential to stress that the issue
was not whether the state agency would have erred in marking out the
election district; it might have arrived at the same solution as the Board.
Its flaw was in having meddled in federal business belonging exclusively
to the Board, whether or not that body was attending to it. This case has
large significance in that it is the beginning of a theory that greatly expands during the 1950's and ousts courts and state agencies of jurisdiction. The theory advances another gradient of the supremacy of federal
law, not by abjuring the uniformity-conformity tension in the courts but
by side-tracking it and marshalling the litigation to the Board in the first
instance.
The disappearance in Bethlehem Steel of any jurisdiction other than
the Board's seems to be grounded upon the supremacy principle relating
and concurrent state legislative jurisdiction.
18. 316 U.S. 31 (1942). On other concerted non-speech pressures see, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sit-down strike); UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs-Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (intermittent unannounced strikes). Briggs-Stratton was overruled expressly in Lodge 76, Intl As'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
19. 330 U.S. 767 (1947). Bethlehem Steel was followed in LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949). For historical perspective it is not too
late to read Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. Rev.

556 (1936).
20.

29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1976).
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to freedom of choice of representatives, although it had not abrogated the
jurisdiction of the Florida court in the Hill case. If the principle is freedom of choice, could it also extend to the campaigning that makes that
choice intelligent, and deprive courts and other agencies of jurisdiction
with respect to employees' oral and printed communications, including
peaceable picketing? The case itself seems to mean that the Board's operations under section 9 strip from other agencies and the courts any similar function. That means the Board's ascertainment of whether employees
wish to bargain collectively, and it matters not whether the court or other
agency would simply duplicate or produce a result at odds with what the
Board would do. Note also that this result comes about only under the
Board's jurisdiction to resolve questions concerning representation without reference to unfair labor practices or to protected employee activities.
The Act obliges the court or other agency to decline jurisdiction rather
than to accord supremacy to applicable federal law. The principle is not
immediately the supremacy of federal law but the primacy of the federal
agency in sequence of litigation.
The Court, from Cooley on, had successfully claimed for state as well as
federal courts jurisdiction to resolve the Commerce Clause question in
favor of uniformity or conformity as a branch of Supremacy Clause doctrine. What the Court had not been notably successful at, though, was
enunciating dependable criteria for applying the distinction. So it is not
to be wondered at that Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in AllenBradley, faded off into an allusion to the "police power" of the states.
The facts of that case pin it down, though, that a state court or agency
has jurisdiction to hold that mass picketing is not protected by the Act.
Other precedents signify nothing against a state court's jurisdiction to decide whether employee choice of representatives or exercise of speech or
press is protected by the Act. So far, there is only one qualification-the
Court's judgment that, in endowing the Board with resolving representation disputes, Congress did not thereby intend a state agency to continue
to have jurisdiction over the same employees in the exercise of "full freedom" under section 9 to choose collective representatives. This qualification entails the resolution of two issues in concluding: (1) under the
Supremacy Clause (as in Hill), nothing in state law that is inconsistent
with the "full freedom" is valid, and (2) the very jurisdiction of a state
agency (in Bethlehem Steel) to direct elections is inconsistent with the
"full freedom" Congress directed its agency, the Board, to foster, no matter that in fact a state agency's order might be exactly congruent with
what the Board would have ordered.
The Court's precedents as of 1947 thus provide two avenues for protection of the employee interest under the Act in freedom of assembly (or
choice of employee representatives). One is under the Supremacy Clause
as it operates upon the Commerce Clause distinction between conformity
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with the states and national uniformity. The other is by way of imputing
to Congress the design of a federal administrative-agency jurisdiction that
is exclusive of the courts' jurisdiction as well as that of other agencies.
Allen-Bradley, the mass picketing case, taken with Hotel & Restaurant
1 another mass
Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,"
picketing case, and with the mutiny case, Southern Steamship Co., could
inspire the speculation that the Court's concern for the protection afforded by the Act may take one form when the activities of employees are
similar to those traditionally understood as shared with other members of
society under the Constitution, and another form when the means employed in those activities transcend those characteristic of constitutionally protected speech, assembly, and press.
The jurisdictional contrast between Hill, the supremacy clause freedom
of association case, and Bethelem Steel, the case of exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board, nevertheless left an unstable boundary between cases that
had to go to the Board first and those which might undergo the
Supremacy Clause test in court or in a state agency. In any event, if the
distinction between the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
and its operations under section 9, as suggested above, is real, Bethelem
Steel would hardly have been an augury for the eventual overruling of
Hill. Bethelem Steel, on these terms, would not forecast a holding that
the state court had no jurisdiction without reaching the issue of law (that
is, whether the state law is compatible with the Act), unless the state
agency is duplicating the Board's administration.

III. THE BOARD'S

SERvrrUDES FOR SPEECH AND PRESS

As of 1947, the Act had been construed to confer upon employees, in
addition to interests protected constitutionally from state or federal interference, a servitude of employers' premises to campaigning for support
of collective bargaining. These activities contain elements of speech, press
and assembly, but the Court validated Board judgments denying immunity to violence and sit-down strikes, and Board judgments creating presumptions that employer interferences with congregation, solicitation, or
handbilling, other than on working time or at work stations, are unfair
labor practices subject to employer justification in terms of employer interests in management or property.'2 Yet, as was subsequently explained
in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,"8 when the employees are already rightfully on
the employer's premises, the employer's "reliance on its property rights is
21.
22.
23.

315 U.S. 437 (1942).
The leading case is still Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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largely misplaced." 2' The Court further observed that if there was any
meaningful intrusion upon the proprietary interests of the employer, it
does not vary with the content of the message in the paper.
The Eastex case emphasizes a cardinal distinction between free speech
and related interests under section 7 of the Act and their constitutional
analogies. The only purpose conditioning the constitutional freedoms of
speech and press (and the freedom of association auxiliary thereto) is enlightenment of the listener or reader. By contrast, there are two purposes
denominated in section 7: collective bargaining (and, since 1947, opposition thereto) and other mutual aid or protection."5 The Court in Eastex
refused to lop off the latter or to subordinate it as merely a component of
the collective bargaining goal. The Court also again sanctioned the
Board's view that, in default of employer evidence of justification based
on managerial interests, the employer's interference with employee distributions is presumed to be an unfair labor practice. The Court has also
purported to sanction the Board's extension of its factory rules about
workplace to hospitals,' 6 but exercised a much wider scope of discretion
in reading the evidence on judicial review than it had mandated for the
7
courts of appeals.2
IV.

FROM TAFr-HARTLEY THROUGH THE 1960's

The 1950's saw the Court impose two important curbs on the Board's
discretion. One of them was an innovative disagreement with the Board
on the beneficiaries of the servitude for employee speech-press-assembly
on employers' premises. In apparent disregard of the definitions in section 2 of the Act," and notwithstanding the statutory purpose of collective bargaining or of mutual aid and protection, the Court took its turn in
erecting a presumption: It is not an unfair labor practice for the employer
to exclude individuals, other than its employees, from its premises absent
evidence of exiguous circumstances, so limiting the alternatives for organizing its employees as to create by such exclusion an "imbalance" in
24. Id. at 572-73. Eastex involved the distribution of a newspaper within immune times
and places, but the paper contained appeals for goals which were beyond the power of the
employer to concede, such as keeping the Texas statute prohibiting union shops from becoming a part of the state constitution.
25. Compare Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975) with NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
26. NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
27. These instructions are set forth in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951).
28. "When used in this subchapter... (3) The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1976).
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the campaign for the hearts and minds of its employees. 29
The Court's conclusion, imposing a disability upon employees other
than those of a particular employer, strained the statutory structure and
may have pushed the Board towards application of the Constitution
rather than the more narrowly purposed immunities of the Act. The
Court at first went along, but later concluded that the analogy of the employer to the state itself had been promoted too far, and ultimately directed the Board to look to the Act, and never mind the resemblance of
the shopping plaza of the 1970's to the company town of the 1940's.s"
That the Board resorted to the Constitution instead of the Act may have
been in part attributable to the Court's presumption against "non-employees" of the employer whose premises these campaigners sought to
use.3 But the signal development of the 1950's made it all but inevitable
that if the employees could not rely upon immunities under the first and
fourteenth amendments, they would be required to rely upon the Board
in the first instance for a favorable wind under the Act.
The exclusive primary jurisdictional approach of the 1940's in denying
the New York board jurisdiction to direct an election because of section 9
of the Act bore fruit in a somewhat expanded and truly innovative form.
Garner v. Teamsters Local 77682 treated the cease-and-desist order jurisdiction of the Board in the same way as its jurisdiction to resolve the
appropriate election district and determine whether to direct an election
therein (resolve a representation question). The issue was whether Pennsylvania through its judicial process could enjoin what was concededly the
subject of the Board's jurisdiction to issue an order. In particular, the
Pennsylvania courts had enjoined picketing to coerce an employer to require its employees to support collective bargaining in the absence of a
"labor dispute" as between the employer and its employees.3 3
As in the Bethlehem Steel case of directing an election, it could not be
trusted to chance, according to the Court, that the state tribunal would
29. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
30. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The company-town constitutional case was
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), which the Court had extended to a shopping center
in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). In Hudgens,
the opinion of the Court contends that Logan Valley had been overruled in a non-labor
case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 424 U.S. at 539 (1972).
31. The Board's application of Logan Valley to an employer parking lot which was adjacent to the employer's store but open to the public was reversed in Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
32. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
33. This absence seems to mean "stranger picketing," arguably protected and arguably
an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the Act, which condemns union activity in
terms of its purpose: in this instance seeking to discriminate against employees to encourage
their support of a labor organization.
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come out the same way as the Board. Hence the state courts had been
deprived of jurisdiction, and it was essential that the first stage of litigation be in a single commerce-regulating chamber, the Board, for the sake
of national uniformity.
Bethlehem Steel had involved more than adjudication. The case involved administration of a comprehensive system of executive and delegated legislative as well as adjudicative powers in the resolution of
whether there was a bargaining representative. The previous leading case
had also involved the imperium in imperio of the Commerce Commission,
which had newly been invested with delegated power to legislate railroad
tariffs. The Court, against the apparently clear direction of the new statute to the contrary, held that the Commission's adjudicative jurisdiction
(reparations awards) superseded that of the courts.3 4 Cases of exclusive
primary jurisdiction under the Interstate Commerce Act and those most
closely related thereto have involved national uniformity in the sense of a
single nationally uniform rate structure and avoidance of the risk (similar
to that identified in Garner)of subversion of the federal rule defining the
rate (or imposing maxima and minima) by individual adjudications at
odds with it. The extraordinary outcome in Garner not only extends the
uniformity concept to injunctions as well as judgments for damages, but
does so in a case in which there were no sublegislative rules to be subverted by adjudicative misjudgments of the facts. 3
The next and most recent sweeping stride towards national uniformity
by means of exclusive primary jurisdiction of a single federal agency, the
Board, was taken in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon. A
state court had awarded damages for a violation of state labor-relations
law. The Court took the occasion not merely to expand Garner regardless
of the state sanction but, completely recasting the rationale for denying
jurisdiction to the state court, extended the Board's initial jurisdiction in
general, with the corresponding defeasance of court and other agency jurisdiction, regardless of whether state law might be characterized as expressing labor-relations policy. That is, both the facts that California law
was congruent with the Act, and that it did not invest the courts with an
injunctive remedy, turned out to be immaterial. Instead, the Court laid it
down that the court or agency must decline jurisdiction if the case merely
presents either of two kinds of issues: whether the activity (speech, or
otherwise) is protected by the Act (presumably section 7) or whether the
34. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), cited in
Garner, 346 U.S. at 497 n.21.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), and contrast
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
36. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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Act (presumably sections 837 and 10) prohibits it. In either case, it is for
the Board to decide such an issue, but as in Bethlehem Steel, it does not
matter if the Board never gets around to deciding.
This does not mean that all other courts and agencies are forever
divested of jurisdiction. First, the Board can err or abuse its discretion,
and in that event, its primary jurisdiction has been exhausted and judicial review in the federal courts accrues. Further, assume that the Board
lawfully concludes that although the activity is not prohibited, neither is
it protected. That amounts to a Supremacy Clause resolution against uniformity, leaving opep the jurisdiction in courts or other agencies to carry
out policy in conformity with state law. 8 '
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart, concurred in Garmon on the ground that the activities of the union for which
the state had awarded damages "may fairly be considered protected...
[hence] state action is precluded until"' 0 the Board has determined that
such activities are unprotected. The subject in Garmon was picketing for
an arguably unfair practice end, as in Garner, as well as arguably protected activities. But note that the four concurring justices viewed the
picketing as prima facie protected, albeit it would not qualify as free
speech in its "obvious and accepted scope." 1
The general rule of defeasance of jurisdiction concurrent with that of
the Board is subject to an exception in favor of such concurrent jurisdiction which is phrased as follows:
It is true that we have allowed the States to grant compensation for the

consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct
marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order .... We
have also allowed the States to enjoin such conduct ....

State jurisdic-

tion has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic
peace is not overriden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional
direction."

It will have been noted that the magisterial "we have allowed" is not addressed to the supremacy clause. There could still be a federal question
under the Act for a court or another agency to resolve. An example
(which is, however, outside the speech-press area) is Machinists Lodge 76
37. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
39. Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n 2, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
40. 359 U.S. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957).
42. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (citations
omitted).
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v. Wisconsin Commission4 s which overruled Briggs-Stratton."
The curious history of the problem in this case makes it useful to go
back to Hill and trace a sequence therefrom. The Court in that case by
necessary implication rejected an argument advanced in the dissent, as it
happens, by Justice Frankfurter, who wrote for the Court in Garmon. His
argument in the Hill dissent was that section 7 of the Act does not define
immunities as against the states but only as against employers. Chief Justice Stone, concurring, expressly rejected the argument, asserting that
section 7 "confers the right of choice generally on employees and not
merely as against the employer."4 ' Then, in Garmon, the Court's opinion
established as an exception, in addition to the compelling state interest in
domestic peace, the following: "In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for
this Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction."' 6 And the Court also had said: "What is outside the scope of this
Court's authority cannot remain within a State's power and state jurisdic7
tion too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board.'4
What the Court was next to do with the "compelling precedent" all but
transcends comprehension. A footnote to the opinion of the Court in Garmon casually forecast the overruling of Briggs-Stratton (the case of intermittent and unannounced work stoppages held unprotected from state
regulation), in these terms: "[T]he approach taken in that case, in which
the Court undertook for itself to determine the status of the disputed
activity, has not been followed in later decisions, and is no longer of general application.'4 8 So what does the Court do, in overruling Briggs-Stratton seventeen years later? Does it hold that the issue of whether concerted refusal to work overtime to get the collective agreement renewed is
protected (from the employer or from the state) should first be presented
to the Board? No. This precedent was so un-controlling that the Court
took hold of the Act and ruled that the conduct in question was not only
not prohibited by the Act but was not regulable by the Board or the
states.
Now, in addition to the exceptions for violence and controlling prece43. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
44. UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). See
note 18 supra.
45. 325 U.S. at 545. The Chief Justice would have held only the licensing scheme invalid,
leaving intact the state's power to punish union officials for fraud, violence, or other
misconduct.
46. 359 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 245.
48. 359 U.S. at 245 n.4.
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dent, Garmon is subject to a new exception: When an activity free of
fraud or violence is led for a bargaining purpose by a representative having the status conferred by section 9 of the Act, courts and state agencies
have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Board to accord immunity
from regulation consistent with the nationally uniform policy of freedom
to exert pressure in contract negotiations. 4 9 And the concerted violation
of work rules as a bargaining tactic is likewise immune, although probably
unprotected from employer discrimination."0
To go back to the end of the 1950's and Garmon, the Court has
equated activities not merely prohibited and not merely protected but
either arguably so as suspending all jurisdiction to award damages as well
as injunction or any other sanctions, except that of the Board. The major
exception is for domestic peace. The Congress straightway created another exception for cases in which the General Counsel or the Board did
not reach the merits."s
Accordingly, if the activity is arguably under the special solicitationhandbilling concert of action immunity of section 7 of the Act and the
Board (or General Counsel) does not decline to reach the merits, the
Board's jurisdiction is exclusive. It may be speculated, then, that this part
of the section 7 immunities comes within neither the domestic peace,
peripheral interest, nor compelling precedent exceptions. "Arguably protected" will suffice to defer the judicial reckoning under the Supremacy
Clause until review of the Board's order on the merits.
49. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
When the pressure of state policy takes the form of a seven-week waiting period before a
claimant can get unemployment benefits, if the claimant is out of work because of a strike,
but thereafter burdens the struck employer with higher premiums because of the increased
benefit load, the Act is not offended, although the strike is a bargaining strike. The Court
could not agree on an opinion partly because, it appears, only three of the majority justices
would distinguish Machinists Lodge 76 as a case of state regulation or prohibition of private
conduct, whereas the other three found sufficient evidence from 1935 history of enactment
of the Wagner and Social Security Acts of a license to the states. The jurisdiction of the
federal district court, however, was not discussed in either the dissenting or the three majority opinions. All appear to read the issue as arising under the Supremacy Clause rather than
as a matter of forum jurisdiction. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976), a case of
what is protected from employer interference or discrimination containing a flirtation with
the possibility that the statutory protection of bargaining propaganda differs from that of
organizing propaganda. The Board, on remand, exhibited its expertise, albeit tersely and
without explanatory findings, by the innovative conclusion that bargaining programs involve
appeals not to patronize, whereas organizational campaigns do not. (The best that can be
said for this startling announcement is that on the facts of that particular case the picketing
was for a bargaining objective and sought to persuade ultimate consumers not to trade.) 230
N.L.R.B. 414, 416, 95 L.R.R.M. 1351, 1353 (1977).
50. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976), as amended by Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541.
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LINN: THE CAMPAIGN DEFAMATION CASE

These estimates, however, turned out to be wrong in the campaign-defamation case of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114.51 The
Court rejected the Garmon formula as applicable to the argument that
defamation perpetrated during an organizing compaign by a union and its
officers is protected, or prohibited as an unfair labor practice in violation
of the Act under section 8(b). A state court does have jurisdiction to apply state remedies in a civil action by the injured person. The plaintiff
was the assistant general manager of the employer, and the handbills accused him and others of lying to the employees and other discreditable
conduct.
The opinion of the Court observed by way of a quotation from its opinion in Garner that although the Act leaves much to the states, Congress
has refrained from telling how much.53 The opinion appealed to an overriding state interest which was merely a peripheral concern of the Act. It
also stressed that its conclusion was experimental and subject to reconsideration, and in that connection stated that the issue was not constitutional but had to do "solely with the degree to which state remedies have
been preempted by the Act."" Now it is clear not only from the Court's
opinion but from the two dissents, 5 that a state remedy of damages for
libel does exist.
The opinion reviews the Board's decisions and concludes that although
the Board tolerates intemperate, abusive, and inaccurate statements of
the union in organizing campaigns, it does not interpret the Act as protecting either the union or the employer in inflicting intentional injury
upon the other by circulating known falsehoods of a defamatory or insulting content.
In light of these considerations it appears that the exercise of state jurisdiction here would be a 'merely peripheral concern of the Labor Manage-

ment Relations Act,' provided it is limited to redressing libel issued with
knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether it was true
or false. Moreover, we believe that 'an overriding state interest' in protecting its residents from malicious libels should be recognized in these

circumstances."
The two quotations within this excerpt were not accompanied by references to their source, but it is readily recognized as Garmon, which ad52. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
53. Id. at 59.
54. Id. at 67.
55. One was by Justice Black based in part on constitutional grounds and the other was
by Justice Fortas, with the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas joining him.
56. 383 U.S. at 61.
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dressed the peripheral interest exception by example of a state remedy
awarding damages and reinstatement in the union of a member expelled
from the union in breach of the union constitution and by-laws." Garmon's overriding state interest exception was for state remedies of damages "for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of
conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order.""
But the Linn opinion does not argue that defamation has the "conduct
marked by" characteristic, other than to observe that libel suits have long
been recognized as preventing violence.
In short, the Court moves back towards Hill rather than Bethlehem
Steel in allowing concurrent jurisdiction, referring to the degree of preemption of state remedies by the Act rather than the exclusion of a state
forum by the primary jurisdiction of the Board. In Hill, the state licensing system was held invalid, but also inconsistent with the Act were the
substantive rules of qualification to represent employees, a complete
wipe-out under the Supremacy Clause. Now, moving from association to
speech, the Court designs (albeit from nothing expressed in the Act) a
series of federal limitations, primarily upon substantive rules of liability,
contemplating both compensatory and punitive damages. Indeed, the
court's competence to award damages is relied on as a reason for concurrent jurisdiction. In addition, the supplementary sanctions likely to be
sought from the Board would not work at cross purposes with the state
sanctions."
Why not? Simply, the state rules of liability (substantive rules of decision) would be congruent with the policies of the Act." They are primarily three. First, the defendant must have published defamatory statements knowing that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether
true or false. Second, the plaintiff must prove the severity of the harm,
but such proof may track state rules about different forms of harm.
Finally, punitive damages are allowable only when compensable harm is
proved. 6 1 The third condition also fits the Court's reference to state
sanctions.'s

57. International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
58. 359 U.S. at 247. Compare Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S.
290 (1977), upholding a somewhat less than traditional remedy under state law for inflicting
mental distress by means of "outrageous conduct."
59. 383 U.S. at 66, 67.
60. See Letter Carriers, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
Because Executive Order No. 11491 contains by implication the federal rule in Linn, its
doctrine is here expressly supplemented by a rule on the scope of appellate review. That is
the duty of the Court itself to make an independent examination of the record, as in constitutional cases, to make sure that the speech is not protected under federal law.
61. 383 U.S. at 65-66.
62. The United States, as amicus, had urged a further federal limitation that the defam-
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Unlike Hill, representing either a federal or a state law determination,
Linn is a new departure, blending (without statutory formula) federal
with state rules to be litigated concurrently with whatever sanctions may
be forthcoming from the Board. It further appears that, as in the bargaining (non-speech) cases, the Board may accord unprotected status to
speech that is tortious under the federal-state rules applicable to labordispute defamation actions in the courts. It may also be seen that there is
an argument under the intermittent-strike bargaining case, that defamation immune from liability in tort is likewise immune from condemnation
as an unfair labor practice, although it may constitute grounds for setting
aside an election.
The high-water line of marshalling issues under the Act to the Board,
in Garmon, had thus been lowered not only by the 1959 amendment conferring jurisdiction upon courts and agencies over labor disputes when the
Board declines to reach the merits, but also by expansion of exceptions
foreshadowed in Garmon in its references to "compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts" (the immunity of union bargaining
tactics from both state and federal regulation), and the exceptions based
on the traditional law of torts and the peripheral interest of the Act. The
defamation vehicle for this expansion deals, of course, with immunity for
the content of speech granted by the Act. The concluding topic will examine picketing, which has
from time to time been characterized as a
3
mode of communication.6
VI. THE EMPLOYER'S PROPERTY LINE
The Court has arrived at a revision of Garmon in a case of trespassory
picketing that is otherwise peaceable. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Carpenters (Sears ),6" this kind of case became the vehicle for a reexamination of Garmon, rather than, as in Linn, a mere invocation of the
traditional law of torts and matters of interest peripheral to the Act. That
is, Sears I reexamines the Garmon formulation as it might be applied to
"conduct traditionally subject to state regulation." The conduct in this
case was intrusion by the pickets on Sears' land, and the traditional state
regulation is injunction against such conduct as a continuing trespass.
ation charged must be "grave" (criminal, homosexual, or other infamous conduct), but the
Court rejected this suggestion. 383 U.S. at 65 n.7.
63. A recent case on a state prohibition of peaceful picketing generated controversy
about whether the issue arose under the due process or equal protection clause, but the
opinion of the Court used the equal protection clause and concluded against the statute
because it discriminated among pickets on the basis of the contents of their expression.
Carey v. Brown, U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980).
64. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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Trespass to land is, of course, like defamation, about as close as any tort
may be to the core of traditional tort law, although its characteristics do
not link up as closely as those of defamation to the compelling interest in
preserving the public peace against violence. In any event, trespass to
land fits the new "conduct traditionally subject to state regulation" quite
comfortably.
Whether this tort, like defamation, is to survive under new federal rules
somehow extracted from the Act in the Garmon or Linn style could not
be readily assumed from this introduction. It turns out that the Act does
not radiate federal rules of decision when the state property line entangles the federal labor dispute. But before reviewing the critical reason for
according to a court the jurisdiction to enjoin picketing on the premises
of an employer, 65 the reader's attention to the opinion of the Court
should have been grabbed by an evident retreat from Garmon's marshalling process.
The first technique is to examine Garmon's "arguably protected" separately from its "arguably prohibited," a technique past due after the
Court's overruling of Briggs-Stratton." Let us look first at the "arguably
prohibited" branch. Recall that the 1950's revealed the Court's suspicion
that tribunals other than the Board would subvert federal uniformity as
required by Congress and that it was no good for concurrent jurisdiction
that the state rule was congruent with the federal rule. The vermin in the
woodwork was that the other tribunal might call the facts wrong on the
evidence.
Here, in terms of Garner, assume that the Act forbids use of the employer's premises for solicitation that takes the form of picketing, and
that California law of trespass agrees. The problem of Garner is that the
court (or agency other than the Board) would mislocate the property line
in relation to the location of the pickets as a matter of fact. That is, the
Board would get the location of the pickets right, whereas the result in
other tribunals was uncertain. The susceptibility of other tribunals to
non-conformity (i.e., local policies in assessing the evidence) was not overbalanced by their expertise in locating the property line. The Garmon
formula reinforced this position giving primacy to the Board's forum by
emphasizing that it made no difference whether state law concerned labor
relations and enforcement by injunction. The principal question was the
applicability of the Act and hence, the "arguably protected-prohibited"
test was not divided into two separate standards.
65. It should be noted that such conduct might be protected under section 7 or be prohibited as an unfair labor practice under section 8.
66. Machinists Lodge 76 invoked NLRB v. Insurance Agents, another bargaining tactics
case containing a clear obiter dictum that a non-speech tactic could be unprotected yet not
prohibited as an unfair labor practice.
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In considering the "prohibited" branch, the Sears I opinion goes back
to Garner and distinguishes it as a state labor-relations law case and refers to the essential proposition that in federal labor disputes the states
have no competence. The opinion concedes that even when state law is
not addressed to labor relations it is displaced by the exclusive primary
jurisdiction of the Board. The examples given, however, are characterized
as state law invoked against "precisely the same conduct. ' 67 The opinion
goes on to show that state laws of "general applicability" have preserved
concurrent jurisdiction when they seek to vindicate "interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act."68
The opinion of the Court in Sears I wiped out the Garmon rationale, as
follows:
The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is
law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general
but whether the controversy presented to the state court is
(as in Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) that which
been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board.69

enforcing a
application
identical to
could have

In short, the Court asserts (contrary to Garmon) that there is a potential distinction between state law not specifically addressed to labor relations and state law that is. The quoted passage seems to say that they
converge only if the general law (of the state) asks the same questions of
the facts as a state labor-relations law would have asked.
The conclusion is telegraphed by the analysis. Jurisdiction aliunde the
Board survives if the forum is administering state law to facts that are
not wholly within the Act. This was implicit in Garner but overruled in
Garmon. Specifically, if speech is arguably prohibited by the Act, its lawfulness must be referred to the Board, unless the speech in question is
arguably prohibited by state law other than labor-relations law.
The Sears I split of Garmon seems to yield, as to facts revealing both
an arguable prohibition of the Act (i.e., a tenable argument that an unfair
labor practice has been committed) and an arguable violation of state law,
jurisdiction concurrent with the Board if state law generates a different
controversy. Such a state law must make material a set of facts different
67. 436 U.S. at 193.
68. Id. at 195; accord, San Diego Bldg. Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959). See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Farmer v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634
(1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
69. 436 U.S. at 197.
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from those the Board would consider as material under the Act. In case of
difference, the Farmercombination of "peripheral concern" of the Act (or
"no realistic threat of interference with the federal scheme") with a
state's "overriding interest" becomes applicable.
There were, in Sears I, some contentions that the picketing was an
unfair practice, depending on whether its purpose was to gain recognition
or to obtain assignment of carpentry work to Union members. It would
not be an unfair practice if the purpose was to obtain compliance with
area standards of working conditions such as pay or hours. The opinion
points out at the outset that the case is not one of picketing "definitely"
protected or prohibited by federal law. But the issue before the court
presents a different controversy, one completely unrelated to ascertaining
the purpose of the picketing and concerned only with whether the location of the picketing was lawful under state law. That answers half the
question of concurrent jurisdiction in favor of the jurisdiction of the
court.
Let us look now at the "arguably-protected" branch. What the opinion
characterizes as "federal supremacy" considerations become "implicated
to a greater extent" than when labor-related activity is prohibited. The
opinion (accurately, it seems) demonstrates a controversy overlap that indeed occurs by reason of the Supremacy Clause. The court's first issue
would be whether the picketing was "actually protected by federal law"
(the Act), because only if it were not would state law come into play.
The Farmer formula seems to have answered the question of how to
deal with the overlap. At least if the remedy under state law is damages
not within the remedial armory of the Board, trust the fact-finding
processes of the courts, and safeguard the supremacy of the Act by courtmade rules of decision and remedy. This means that federal law will be
vindicated by the appellate process as applicable to courts in general
rather than exclusively by way of judicial review of the Board.
Another way, prior to Farmer, of coping with the overlap was resolved
in NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 7 0 another picketing case. Let the Board sue

in federal court to enjoin litigation in state court. That case presents a
purpose of the picketing that was, in an unusual sense, "arguably" protected. Its arguably protected status was unusual because the Board's
trial examiner had recommended a finding of unfair labor practices on
the part of the employer. Although the Board had not acted on the trial
examiner's report, if the report had been adopted, it is highly likely that
the picketing was protected because there is not much picketing that is
more "protected" than picketing to remonstrate with an employer about
his violations of the Act. Thus, in Sears I, the other half of the dismem70.

404 U.S. 138 (1971).
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berment of Garmon could have been avoided had the Board chosen to
take action in federal court to "enjoin a state court order which regulates
peaceful picketing governed by the federal agency. "71
Yet, in Sears I, the Court declines the invitation of Farmer. NashFinch was no help because the Sears I facts lacked the intervention of
the Board under its license to resort to federal court to enjoin orders of
state courts. Instead, Sears I constructs a procedural restriction, rather
than speaking to the state and federal courts by the free-speech authority
that Linn found in the Act. Thus it seems to have complicated doctrine
by another subdivision in addition to the distinction between arguably
prohibited and arguably protected by the Act. The other subdivision is
between speech in its "obvious and accepted scope" and speech communicated by picketing.
The former focuses on content protected by the Board and the courts
concurrently, under a set of rules drawn from the Act if it is commerce
and labor relations connected. In the second instance, picketing, nothing
in Sears I alters the Garmon exception for the primacy of state law (for
the Board as well as the courts) when the conduct mentioned as picketing
actually involves or even arguably involves "conduct marked by violence
and imminent threats to the public order." The issue is whether, when
the state tort is arguably trespass quare clausum fregit and not trespass
vi et armis, and it is also arguably what the Act protects, has the court
lost jurisdiction? The innovation is that it may have and that Farmer
does not apply because, although the court may be obliged first to decide
whether, under the Act, the picketing is protected, there are no new federal rules addressed to the court as such.
Instead, the Court in Sears I addresses the employer seeking an injunction under state law in state court.73 In the last footnote of the opinion,
the Court chooses to alert the reader to a fact critical to its holding-the
demand by Sears that the pickets withdraw to the streets." The holding,
then, is that when picketing is trespassory but otherwise peaceable, and is
being conducted by a labor organization against an employer subject to
the active jurisdiction of the Board, the Board's jurisdiction is exclusive
unless prior to resort to a court or, perhaps, to another agency, the employer shall have demanded that the trespass be discontinued. That is,
conversely, the Board's jurisdiction is concurrent only when such a demand has been made. This rule, like the rules about malice and compensable harm in Linn, is federal, supposedly somehow drawn from the Act.
This federal rule of a "demand," when picketing is arguably protected
71. Id. at 139-140.
72. This is the route of action presumably because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).

73. 436 U.S. at 207 n.44.
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though trespassory, amounts to the Court's disagreement with the
Board's rule that any person may make a charge. 4 The Court asserts that
Sears had no right to invoke the Board's jurisdiction and implies that the
Carpenters did. Except for a situation involving an expedited election
under section 8(b)(7), it seems clear that both propositions cannot be
right. There is a sense in which it must be insisted that only the General
Counsel can invoke the jurisdiction of the Board under section 10. Nevertheless, it turns out that under the precise facts of this case, in which no
charges had been filed, but the federal demand to terminate the state
trespass had given the union ample opportunity to file charges, the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court created no "significant risk of
prohibition of protected conduct."

VII. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION
The general rule is that the Act forbids jurisdiction concurrent with
that of the Board when there is a substantial risk that the controversies
will overlap, but this does not apply to claims within the traditional law
of torts even if there is such overlap. When the claim is based on speech
or speech-related conduct there are two distinct and unrelated "rulettes."
If the claim is for defamation, jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the
Board, but the rules of decision, in a case in which the facts come under
the Act, are federal. If the claim is arguably protected trespassory picketing, jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Board is qualified by a federal condition that neither party files charges and the employer, before
going to court, demands that the pickets move back to the street.
The cardinal principle of the foregoing discussion of the increment to
freedom of speech and press afforded employees under the Act, in addition to their constitutional rights, is that the language of the Act in section 7 is not confined to action in concert as such but includes communication. The Court underscores this principle by its Garmon exception in
favor of a concurrent forum when the subject is not speech but violence.
However, when there are speech-press considerations, the post-Garmon
developments spell out a distinction earlier marked out in the constitutional arena between picketing-speech and other speech. These developments in the speech-press area belie, although they render diminishing
lip-service to the Garmon, "arguably" formula. It turns out that nonpicketing communication goes one way and trespassory picketing another.
This distinction, however, was in no way telegraphed by the Court's constitutional precedents, and this essay accordingly submits that the Court

74.
75.

29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1979).
436 U.S. at 207.
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has here arrogated to itself the semilegal, or even non-legal, technique
that it had earlier reserved to itself in due process cases s6 -that is, a
Delphic oracularity in construing the Constitution, now extended to the
Act.
In the incremental area of the Act's protection of employee solicitation
and handbilling, and now placarding or solicitation on the picket line, the
Court has set its jaw against the "arguably prohibited" Garmon formula.
Absent picketing, and when the issue is the content of the communication, Garmon is altogether overruled. Instead, the Act as supreme law is
to be enforced (under the malice and other rules) by whatever tribunal in
which it is properly invoked. But the scene shifts, if the mode of communication is picketing, to a federally-dictated protocol under the Act: tell
the pickets to move back before you seek to enjoin the picketing.
The theme of these complex, and after-the-fact-invented rules for solicitation and handbilling is a retreat from the broad exclusivity of the
Board as a forum. Rather, the Court here seems to favor applications of
the supremacy clause under the two rules, one largely substantive and the
other procedural, neither hinted at in the Act or its legislative history but
both imputed to it.

76. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877): The "gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require." See also InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958), where the Court went all
the way to the Pythia at Delphi. For an entertaining and learned discussion of the classical
allusion see C. Morris, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 783, 784 n.12 (1971).

